Pushing back against push-backs: a right of entry for asylum seekers unlawfully prevented from reaching Italian territory by Borelli, Silvia
1 
 
PUSHING BACK AGAINST PUSH-BACKS: A RIGHT OF ENTRY FOR ASYLUM 
SEEKERS UNLAWFULLY PREVENTED FROM REACHING ITALIAN TERRITORY 
 
Silvia Borelli* 
 
Abstract 
A decision of a civil court in Rome has reaffirmed the illegality of ‘push-back’ 
operations under both Italian and international law. In a noteworthy and innovative 
development, the court further held that, in light of the fact that the claimants had 
been wrongfully prevented from reaching Italian territory, they had a subjective 
right as a matter of Italian constitutional law to be admitted to Italy so as to be able 
to make an application for international protection. The decision has potentially far-
reaching implications for future cases before the Italian courts in the field of 
migration, and may also pave the way for similar findings at the international level. 
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1. On 28 November 2019, a judge of the first civil section of the Tribunal of Rome 
handed down a much-awaited judgment in respect of claims against the Italian 
authorities relating to the ‘push-back’ on the high seas of vessels carrying irregular 
migrants (Tribunal of Rome, First Civil Section, Judgment no. 22917/2019, 
published 28 November 2019). The complaint related to events occurring in the 
summer of 2009 and was submitted by fourteen Eritrean nationals who had been 
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aboard a boat on the high seas attempting to cross from Libya to Lampedusa. 
Following a rescue operation carried out by an Italian Navy vessel, the claimants had 
been forcibly transferred onto a Libyan coastguard boat and then returned to Libya. 
The claimants, all of whom at the time the claim was brought were outside Italian 
territory, alleged that their return to Libya had been unlawful. They brought a civil 
action in tort under Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code against the Italian Interior 
Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of 
the Prime Minister. In addition to seeking pecuniary compensation, they sought an 
order compelling the authorities to allow them to enter Italian territory to submit an 
application for international protection. The decision, allowing the claims and 
finding the Ministry of Defence and Office of the Prime Minister liable, constitutes 
an extremely important development in a number of respects. Quite apart from the 
clear recognition of the domestic and international unlawfulness of the push-back 
operation, the judgement is of particular note for the court’s conclusions and 
reasoning as to the consequences flowing from the illegal conduct of the Italian 
authorities.  
 
2. The claimants had fled Eritrea and travelled to Libya with the intention of reaching 
Italy and seeking international protection there. They departed from Libya in late 
June 2009, on board a vessel carrying in excess of eighty migrants. On 30 June 2009, 
after a few days at sea, the engine of the boat failed and the vessel remained stranded 
in international waters, some 26 nautical miles off the coast of the island of 
Lampedusa; those on board were subsequently rescued by a ship of the Italian Navy, 
the Orione. The claimants, and several other witnesses, testified that, following their 
transfer to the Orione, the rescued migrants were first searched by members of the 
Italian military, who seized their personal belongings, and then assigned 
identification numbers and photographed. Despite the migrants being given 
assurances that the ship was heading towards Italy, where they would be able to seek 
international protection, the Orione instead headed in the direction of Libya. It was 
subsequently met by a Libyan coastguard vessel, on to which the migrants were 
transferred and then taken back to Libya, where they were detained for a number of 
months and ill-treated whilst in captivity. The claimants subsequently attempted to 
reach Europe overland, but were detained in Israel.  
The incident at issue is just one of the many instances of so-called push-backs at 
sea to have occurred since 2009, involving the interception of migrants before they 
can reach Italian territory and their forced return to the country of embarkation. 
These operations have taken place against the background of the arrangements on 
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migration control concluded between Libya and Italy, which themselves are but one 
example of the ongoing trend towards the ‘externalization of borders’ and the 
outsourcing of migration control operations by European States and the EU itself to 
departure States on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Whilst various 
arrangements relating to migration control have been entered into between Italy and 
Libya in the past (see E. Paoletti, “Relations among Unequals? Readmission between 
Italy and Libya”, Middle East Institute, 2010, at www.mei.edu), the most notable 
instrument remains the Treaty of Friendship signed in 2008 by Muammar Gaddafi 
and the then Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Treaty of Friendship, 
Partnership, and Cooperation between the Italian Republic and the Great Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Benghazi, 30 August 2008, unofficial English 
translation available at www.perfar.eu; for commentary, see N. Ronzitti, “The Treaty 
on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects 
for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?”, in  Bulletin of Italian Politics 2009, p. 125 
ss.; M. Giuffré, “State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for Italy’s 
Push-backs to Libya?”, in International Journal of Refugee Law 2013, p. 692 ss.). 
An essential part of the overall deal embodied in the Treaty was its reaffirmation of 
the already existing cooperation between the two States in matters of migration 
control and the reiteration of the force of pre-existing agreements, notably a 2007 
Memorandum of understanding which provided for joint patrols off the Libyan 
coasts by mixed crews aboard patrol boats to be provided by Italy (Article 19, Treaty 
of Friendship, cit.; see also European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and 
Others v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012 [GC], para. 
19; for commentary, see S. Borelli and B. Stanford, “Troubled Waters in the Mare 
Nostrum: Interception and Push-Backs of Migrants in the Mediterranean and the 
European Convention on Human Rights”, in Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika 2014, 
p. 29 ss.). In February 2011, following the uprising in Libya and Italian involvement 
in the intervention which resulted in the overthrow of the Gaddafi government, the 
Treaty of Friendship was suspended (see European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi 
Jamaa v. Italy, cit., para. 21). Thereafter, on 2 February 2017, in the lead-up to the 
EU summit in Malta, the Italian Government and the UN-backed Government of 
National Accord in Tripoli signed a further undertaking aimed at ‘combat[ing] illegal 
immigration, human trafficking and contraband’ and ‘reinforcing border security’ 
(Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of development, the 
fight against illegal immigration, human trafficking and fuel smuggling and on 
reinforcing the security of borders between the State of Libya and the Italian 
Republic, Rome, 2 February 2017 (hereinafter ‘the 2017 MoU’), unofficial English 
translation available at eumigrationlawblog.eu). The 2017 MoU, which was 
subsequently endorsed by the EU Council (see Malta Declaration by the members 
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of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the 
Central Mediterranean route, 3 February 2017, and “Informal meeting of EU heads 
of state or government, Malta, 3 February 2017”, both available at 
www.consilium.europa.eu) reiterates and expands the commitments undertaken by 
Italy in previous agreements to provide financial support for migration containment 
activities undertaken by Libya. Notably, Italy undertook to provide additional 
financial and technical support so as to allow the Libyan Navy and coastguard to 
intercept migrant boats in Libyan territorial waters (2017 MoU, cit., Articles 1 and 
4), and to provide assistance in order to improve health conditions in the Libyan-run 
detention facilities in Libya in which intercepted migrants were to be held pending 
their repatriation (ibid., Articles 2 and 4). 
 
3. The first substantive question addressed in the judgment of the Rome court 
concerns the legality of the push-back operation which had led to the return of the 
claimants to Libya. On this issue, the judge followed the lead of the European Court 
of Human Rights in its 2012 judgment in Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy in holding that such 
operations violate the prohibitions of refoulement and collective expulsion under 
international law. The court set the scene for its assessment of the merits of the 
applicants’ claim by briefly reviewing the international norms applicable to Italy 
relevant to the protection of individuals seeking international protection, including, 
first and foremost, the prohibition of refoulement contained in Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, as well as the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
recognised in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
international prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment under Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the prohibition of collective 
expulsion in Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR (Judgment, cit., p. 8). Having 
highlighted that, in addition to – and in support of – the protections deriving from 
international norms, the right to seek asylum was recognised in the Italian legal 
system by Article 10(3) of the Constitution, the court turned to examine the scope of 
application of the principle of non-refoulement. It recalled in this regard the position 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that the 
prohibition of refoulement encompasses «any measure attributable to a State which 
could have the effect of returning an asylum-seeker or refugee to the frontiers of 
territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened, or where he or she 
would risk persecution» (Judgment, cit., p. 8, citing UNHCR, Note on International 
Protection, 13 September 2001, UN doc. A/AC.96/951) and that such measures 
include «rejection at the frontier, interception and indirect refoulement, whether of 
an individual seeking asylum or in situations of mass influx» (ibid.). In that context, 
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the judge underlined that the due diligence obligations arising from the prohibition 
of refoulement require the authorities to ascertain that any country to which migrants 
are to be returned offers sufficient guarantees that they will not be subjected to 
proscribed treatment upon return and that, in the face of a situation of widespread 
and systematic violations of human rights in the destination country, there is a duty 
on the returning State to obtain information on the likely treatment that will be faced 
by returned migrants, regardless of whether any claim for asylum has been lodged 
(Judgment, cit., p. 9, referring to European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa v. 
Italy, cit.).  
As regards the prohibition of collective expulsion under Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 to the ECHR, the court, again referring to Hirsi Jamaa, highlighted that the 
prohibition also applies when the removal of foreign nationals within the jurisdiction 
of the State takes place outside its territory, including in the context of migration 
control operations on the high seas. In this regard, the judge noted that the basis for 
that conclusion given by the Grand Chamber was the need to avoid the possibility of 
a situation in which a State was able to remove a group of foreign nationals without 
considering their individual situations (Judgment, cit., p. 9). By way of synthesis of 
the effect of the various relevant norms, the judge concluded that, when a State 
intercepts migrants on the high seas, it is under an obligation to ensure that its 
competent authorities ascertain the situation of each individual, and not to send them 
back to a State in which there was a risk that their life or freedom would be 
endangered (ibid., p. 9). 
Applying those principles to the claimants’ case, the judge noted that, at the time 
of the relevant operation, several international organizations and NGOs had 
extensively and credibly documented widespread and systematic abuses and 
inhumane conditions of detention of irregular migrants in Libya. On that basis, she 
concluded that the Italian authorities therefore knew, or at least had been in a position 
to know, that Libya could not be regarded as a safe country to which migrants could 
be returned. In addition, there likewise had existed numerous reports documenting 
both the risk that Eritrean migrants returned to Libya would then be sent back to 
Eritrea, and the substantial risk of violation of their fundamental rights if they were 
so returned (ibid., pp. 9-10).  
The only substantive defence on the merits put forward by the Italian authorities 
was that the conduct at issue was legal, insofar as it had been in accordance with 
Italian legislation on the control of irregular migration and the 2008 Treaty of 
Friendship, such that the authorities had merely given effect to an international 
agreement (ibid., p. 7). That argument was given short shrift; the court held that, 
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even assuming that, as argued by the respondent public bodies, the Treaty of 
Friendship had expressly provided for the return to Libya of intercepted migrants – 
a proposition which the court did not accept, given that the Treaty made no reference 
to such operations – , the Italian authorities could not invoke a bilateral agreement 
as a justification for disregarding international obligations for the protection of 
human rights. The court further noted in this regard that the Treaty of Friendship 
stipulated expressly that actions taken pursuant to it were to be taken in compliance 
with and respecting relevant international obligations (ibid., p. 10). It therefore 
concluded that the conduct of the Italian authorities which had resulted in the return 
of the applicants to Libya had been unlawful as a matter of both international and 
domestic law and that, as such, it gave rise to civil liability for an unlawful act 
pursuant to Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code. 
 
4. The court’s synthesis of the relevant norms and its reiteration of the illegality of 
push back operations is valuable. The most interesting and innovative aspect of the 
judgment is, however, without any doubt, its treatment of the appropriate remedies 
for those violations and the consequences flowing from its finding of illegality. The 
question of compensation for the non-pecuniary harm suffered by the claimants was 
dealt with relatively swiftly, with the quantum of the appropriate compensation being 
fixed by reference to the award of the European Court of Human Rights in similar 
circumstances in the Hirsi Jamaa case (Judgment, cit., p. 12). In addition, however, 
having found that, as a result of the action of the Italian authorities, the applicants 
had been prevented from exercising their constitutional right to apply for asylum, the 
court held that the authorities were under a duty to allow the applicants to enter 
Italian territory so that they could lodge an application for international protection. 
Significantly, that conclusion was justified not on the basis that it constituted a 
remedial measure deriving from the illegality of the push-back operation, but rather 
as a result of the recognition of a free-standing right deriving from the 
(constitutional) right to seek asylum.   
The applicants had asked the court to order the Italian authorities to adopt the 
measures necessary to allow them to enter Italian territory with a view to applying 
for international protection as a form of restitution in kind for the violations alleged; 
according to the claimants, the appropriate measure was the granting of a 
humanitarian visa under Article 25 of the Visa Code (Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a 
Community Code on Visas). The court found, however, that the claimants’ request 
could not be qualified as a request for restitution under the general norm in Article 
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2058 of the Civil Code, which provides for the possibility of specific redress in 
favour of a claimant aimed at restoring the status quo ante. Whilst agreeing with the 
respondent authorities as to the impossibility of making an order for entry as a form 
of specific redress, the judge instead went on to recharacterize the claimants’ request 
to be granted entry to Italian territory for the purpose of applying for international 
protection, holding that it was properly to be regarded as being «a request for a 
declaration as to the existence of a right to lodge a request for international 
protection» (Judgment, cit., p. 13).  
The remaining part of the court’s reasoning concerning the basis of the right 
identified to be granted access to Italian territory was founded primarily on Article 
10(3) of the Italian Constitution – albeit with frequent references to relevant 
international norms – and was based on an expansive reading of the scope of right to 
asylum contained in that provision. Having recalled that the constitutionally 
recognised right of asylum found expression in the Italian legal system thorough the 
three institutions of refugee status, subsidiary protection and – until its repeal in 2018 
– humanitarian protection (see Decree-law no. 113 of 4 October 2018, converted into 
Law no. 132 of 1 December 2018), the judge noted the settled position of the Court 
of Cassation that, as a result of the ‘exhaustive nature’ of the norms regulating the 
three forms of international protection, there remained no residual margin for the 
direct application of Article 10(3) of the Constitution (Judgment, cit., p. 14, citing, 
among others, Court of Cassation, First Civil Section, Judgment no. 28969/2019 of 
8 November 2019). It is at this point that the court’s reasoning took an innovative 
turn; it observed that the norms regulating the various forms of international 
protection could be applied only «where they were capable of practical 
implementation and where the preconditions for the grant of a form of international 
protection under those norms are present» (Judgment, cit., pp. 14-15), and reasoned 
that the situation was different where the application of the existing framework was 
in practice not possible, including for reasons not attributable to a potential applicant 
and which were entirely independent of his or her actions or will. Such situations 
included – the court observed – those where the applicant was not within Italian 
territory, and therefore unable to lodge a request for international protection, which, 
under the relevant domestic norms, can only be submitted by an alien either at the 
point of entry, or once within Italian territory (ibid., p. 15, referring to Article 6, 
Legislative Decree no. 25/2008, “Implementation of Directive 2005/85/EC on 
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status”, G.U., Serie Generale n. 40 of 16 February 2008). On that basis, 
relying on prior pronouncements of the Court of Cassation which had characterised 
the right to international protection as a directly enforceable right of the individual 
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(‘a perfect subjective right’), the existence of which did not depend upon formal 
recognition by the State authorities, the judge reasoned that there was a need to 
«expand the scope of international protection through a direct application of Article 
10(3) of the Constitution with a view to protecting the position of those individuals 
who, as a consequence of an illegal act committed by the Italian authorities, are 
unable to submit an application for international protection as they are not present in 
the territory of the State as a result of the authorities of the State having prevented 
entry, following a collective push-back, in violation of constitutional principles and 
of the Charter of  Rights of the European Union» (Judgment, cit., pp. 15-16). The 
court accordingly held that there existed a subjective right of the applicants under 
Article 10(3) of the Constitution «to enter the territory of the State in order to be able 
to make an application for international protection», whilst at the same time 
recognising that the method by which that right was to be given effect, and the 
eventual determination upon the merits of any such application, remained for the 
competent authorities (ibid., pp. 16-17).  
 
5. The court’s recognition of a right of the claimants to be allowed entry into the 
territory for the purpose of submitting an application for international protection, and 
the correlative obligation on the part of the Italian authorities to take the measures 
necessary to allow the claimants to enter for that purpose, is a novel and significant 
development. Two aspects of the ruling call for particular comment.  
First, the judgment sets forth an approach which is potentially applicable under 
Italian law to all cases of migration control, including those which have been 
deliberately designed so as to take place entirely outside Italian territory. At least 
one passage of the judgment is framed in extremely broad terms, and the judge 
appeared to recognise that a right to be allowed entry to make an application for 
international protection may exist under Article 10(3) of the Italian Constitution 
whenever the applicability of the relevant norms regulating applications for 
international protection are not applicable «for reasons not attributable to matters 
within the control of the applicant and totally independent of his or her conduct or 
will» (Judgment, cit., p. 15). The better view, however, is probably that the ratio of 
the judgment is somewhat narrower, and is represented by the court’s holding that 
individuals seeking asylum have a subjective right to enter where they have been 
physically prevented from reaching Italian territory by conduct of the Italian 
authorities which is illegal under domestic and/or international law (ibid., pp. 15-
16). Even if this narrower understanding is the correct reading of the judgment, the 
civil court has nevertheless de facto introduced, albeit in relatively circumscribed 
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circumstances, an element of extraterritorial application of the domestic 
constitutional law right to asylum. That is significant, insofar as the right to asylum 
under Italian law has traditionally been configured as requiring the presence of the 
individual in question on Italian territory, with the result that, de facto, it only 
becomes applicable upon an individual reaching Italian territory and thus able to 
make a request for international protection. 
Second, and quite apart from these considerations of domestic law, one may 
question the extent to which the holding of the Rome civil court is generalisable and 
potentially of wider application outside the specific Italian constitutional context. In 
this regard, it should be recognized at the outset that the court’s holding as to the 
existence of a right to be allowed entry in order to present a request for international 
protection goes beyond the accepted limits of the right to asylum under current 
international law. In particular, it is relatively well-established that, leaving to one 
side the prohibition of refoulement, there exists no general substantive right as a 
matter of international law to be permitted entry to a State, including in order to make 
a claim for asylum (see, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 
cit., para. 113; R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 
I: Peace, Parts 2 to 4 (9th ed., Harlow, 1992), §§ 399-402; see also G. Goodwin-Gill 
and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed., Oxford, 2007), pp. 206-
208). This does not, however, preclude the possibility of characterising an obligation 
of the authorities to allow entry for the purposes of submitting an application for 
protection as being the most appropriate remedial measure in response to systemic 
state action aimed at unlawfully stemming migration flows and which results in the 
return of individuals to countries where their fundamental rights are at risk of 
violation. Whilst the Rome court grounded its decision on the existence of a right of 
entry to present an application for international protection as a necessary component 
of the domestic right to asylum, and held that the same outcome could not, as a matter 
of the domestic law relating to remedies, be achieved through an order for restitution 
of the status quo ante, it is arguable that as a matter of international law, the situation 
is the converse. As a matter of general international law, the default form of 
reparation is restitution, so as to put the injured party in the position they would have 
been in but for the breach of obligation (cf. Article 35, International Law 
Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, as annexed to General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 12 December 2001, UN 
doc. A/RES/56/83). It is at the least arguable that where there is a finding of violation 
of the prohibition of collective expulsion under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the 
ECHR, or of the right to a remedy under Article 13 taken with Article 3 ECHR, the 
appropriate way in which to achieve restitution and give effect to the obligation to 
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give adequate consideration to the circumstances of each individual applicant 
(recognised, inter alia, in European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 
cit., paras 177 and 184; see also Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application 
no. 16643/09, Judgment of 21 October 2014, paras. 170 and 210) is to permit the 
individuals to make an application. If, under the relevant domestic legislation, such 
an application can only be made from within national territory, then this may be seen 
as necessarily implying a right of entry for that purpose. 
It remains to be seen whether the European Court of Human Rights may in the 
future be prepared to indicate specific individual measures requiring the State to 
permit entry of migrants who were seeking international protection but who were 
prevented from making an application by a push-back or other measures taken by 
the intended destination State. In the factually very similar case of Hirsi Jamaa, the 
Court did not do so; while holding that it was appropriate to indicate the individual 
measures required to ensure execution of the judgment under Article 46 ECHR, the 
European Court found that the action required of the Italian Government was limited 
to «[…] tak[ing] all possible steps to [obtain] assurances from the Libyan authorities 
that the applicants will not be subjected to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of 
the Convention or arbitrarily repatriated [to their countries of origin]» (European 
Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, cit., para. 211). Other cases concerning 
violations of procedural obligations relating to protection against refoulement, 
however, clearly show that the Court is prepared, in appropriate cases, to indicate 
even relatively intrusive measures as being what is required in order to remedy the 
breach. Notably, in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Grand Chamber concluded 
that Greece had breached, inter alia, Article 13 ECHR taken with Article 3 as a 
consequence of the serious flaws in its asylum system, and the consequent risk of 
the applicant being expelled to Afghanistan «without any serious examination of the 
merits of his asylum application» (European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v 
Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011 [GC], 
dispositif, para. 7). The Court indicated in that context that it was «incumbent on 
Greece, without delay, to proceed with an examination of the merits of the 
applicant’s asylum request that meets the requirements of the Convention and, 
pending the outcome of that examination, to refrain from deporting the applicant» 
(ibid., para. 402). Although admittedly in a somewhat different factual context, given 
that the Court has found that the obvious remedy for a flawed asylum process is a 
stay of deportation to allow an applicant to have their application duly considered, it 
would not be too much of a stretch for the Court in the future to order a State to allow 
entry of an individual who has been unlawfully prevented by the State from reaching 
the territory and submitting their application in the first place. Notably, in Hirsi 
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Jamaa itself, one of the judges chided the Court in a concurring opinion for its 
caution in specifying the limited individual measures required and expressed the 
view that the Italian Government had «a positive obligation to provide the applicants 
with practical and effective access to an asylum procedure in Italy» (European Court 
of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, cit., Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque). 
 
6. Since the events at issue in the case, the situation on the ground has already to a 
large extent evolved, and the efforts of European States to stem migration flows 
coming from the coasts of North Africa have largely moved away from direct 
interventions such as push-backs. Notably, in the context of supervision of execution 
of the judgment in Hirsi Jamaa before the Council of Ministers, the Italian 
government indicated that push-back operations had been suspended and would not 
be resumed (see CoE doc. DH-DD(2016)785, 25/07/2016; for the Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers closing examination of the execution of the judgment, adopted 
at the 1264th meeting of the Minister’s Deputies on 14/9/2016, see CoE doc. 
CM/ResDH(2016)221)). Instead, Italy (and other European States) have turned to 
alternative methods of limiting migrant flows. The evolving practice of 
arrangements has gravitated towards a model by which transit countries are provided 
significant incentives to police their own territory and either prevent migrants from 
embarking on vessels bound for Europe, or engage in ‘pull-back’ operation by 
intercepting vessels departing their shores, and returning those on board.  In addition, 
there has in recent years been at least one example of ‘privatised push-back’, 
accomplished through the Italian search and rescue authorities instructing a merchant 
ship to rescue migrants in distress on the high seas, and to then consign them directly 
to the Libyan authorities (see Forensic Architecture, “Privatised Push-back of the 
Nivin” (2009), available at forensic-architecture.org, and see below).  
In light of the position taken by the European Court of Human Rights in relation 
to, on the one hand, the legality of push-backs and, on the other, the applicability of 
the ECHR to extraterritorial actions of Contracting States – including law 
enforcement operations at sea (European Court of Human Rights, Medvedyev and 
Others v France, Application No 3394/03, Judgment of 29 March 2010) and 
extraterritorial detention abroad (see European Court of Human Rights: Al-Saadoon 
and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, Application no. 61498/08, Judgment of 2 March 
2010; and Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom [GC], Application no. 27021/08, Judgment 
of 7 July 2010) – it was perhaps inevitable that European States would seek to put in 
place alternative migration control arrangements designed in such a way as to ensure 
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that the relevant actions are, to the greatest possible extent, undertaken with minimal 
direct involvement, or even solely by transit countries. Further litigation is pending 
before the European Court of Human Rights which will test the extent to which new 
arrangements of this type entered into by Italy can properly be regarded as 
implicating its responsibility under the ECHR. Of particular interest in this regard is 
an application lodged with the Court in May 2018, alleging Italy’s responsibility for 
violations of, inter alia, Articles 2 and 3 ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as a 
result of a ‘pull-back’ operation carried out by a patrol boat, which was operated by 
the Libyan coastguard, but provided by the Italian Government (S.S. and others v. 
Italy, Application no. 21660/18, communicated on 26 June 2019, available at 
hudoc.echr.coe.int).The incident, which involved a rescue vessel belonging to the 
non-governmental group Sea-Watch attempting to carry out rescue operations which 
were interfered with by the Libyan coastguard, resulted in the deaths of at least 
twenty migrants and the forcible return of 47 others to Libya. Similarly, a complaint 
alleging Italy’s breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
due to a ‘privatised push-back’ has recently been lodged with the Human Rights 
Committee (SDG v. Italy, Communication to the UN Human Rights Committee 
under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 18 December 2019, available at 
c5e65ece-003b-4d73-aa76-
854664da4e33.filesusr.com/ugd/14ee1a_e0466b7845f941098730900ede1b51cb.pd
f); that case relates to a rescue operation carried out in November 2018, during which 
the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) of Rome, having requested a 
private merchant vessel, the Nivin, to assist a migrant boat adrift in international 
waters, then instructed the captain to liaise with the Libyan coastguard, resulting in 
the disembarkation of the rescued migrants in Libyan, where they were allegedly 
subsequently ill-treated. 
A crucial question in those cases concerns the consequences of the relatively 
high degree of cooperation and support provided by Italy to the Libyan authorities, 
including the close collaboration between the authorities of the two countries in 
rescue/interception operations and the financial and logistical support provided by 
Italy in the running of immigration detention facilities in Libya. It remains to be seen 
whether this support will be held to be sufficient to trigger the responsibility of Italy 
under the ECHR, either directly due to attribution of the actions carried out by the 
Libyan authorities, or on the basis of complicity, pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility (for discussion, see, e.g., F. De Vittor, 
“Responsabilità degli Stati e dell’Unione europea nella conclusione e 
nell’esecuzione di ‘accordi’ per il controllo extraterritoriale della migrazione”, in 
Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 2018, p. 5 ss.; G. Pascale “Is Italy 
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internationally responsible for the gross human rights violations against migrants in 
Libya?”, in QIL – Questions of International Law 2019, Zoom-in 56, p. 35 ss., 
available at www.qil-qdi.org; M. Baumgärtel, “High Risk, High Reward: Taking the 
Question of Italy’s Involvement in Libyan ‘Pullback’ Policies to the European Court 
of Human Rights”, in EJIL: Talk!, 14 May 2018, available at www.ejiltalk.org; A. 
Liguori, “The Externalization of Border Controls and the Responsibility of 
Outsourcing States under the European Convention on Human Rights”, in Rivista di 
diritto internazionale 2018, p. 1228 ss.).  
 
7. Against the background of the increasingly inventive arrangements developed by 
European States to prevent and impede migrants and asylum seekers from reaching 
Europe, the decision of the Rome court constitutes an important precedent. Although 
the developments in migration control strategies outlined above have led some 
commentators to assert that the decision has «little relevance for the present» (G. del 
Turco and M. Savino, “Chi è stato illegittimamente respinto ha diritto di rientrare in 
Italia?”, in ADiM Blog, January 2020, at www.adimblog.com), the judgment may 
equally be seen as potentially paving the way for a more robust and effective judicial 
response to such practices. Indeed, the reasoning of the court with regard to the ‘right 
to be allowed entry’ is framed in terms apt to apply not only to cases of direct push-
backs at sea, but also to any other situation in which the Italian authorities are found 
to have unlawfully prevented an applicant from having his or her asylum application 
given proper consideration by preventing them from reaching Italian territory. The 
pending cases mentioned in the preceding section are likely to establish how far 
international human rights courts and monitoring bodies are prepared to go in finding 
Italy responsible for human rights violations occurring as a result of arrangements 
designed precisely to outsource responsibility for migration control to other States. 
If the Italian authorities are found to have violated their international obligations as 
a result of those arrangements, the question of whether a ‘right to be allowed entry’ 
exists becomes of clear relevance. That this is the case is evidenced by the recently 
submitted complaint in respect of the Nivin incident, in which the decision of the 
Rome court has been relied upon by the applicant in support of the request that the 
UN Human Rights Committee recommend «that Italy adopts measures to ensure that 
[the claimant] and any other individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of 
a privatised, or otherwise delegated, push-back, and who is in need of international 
protection, has access to entry in the Italian territory […]» (SDG v. Italy, cit., para. 
106 (iii)).  
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The notion of a general right for individuals facing persecution to enter the 
territory of a foreign State in order to apply for protection is still very far from being 
recognised under international law, and, even in the face of the loss of life resulting 
from attempts by migrants to cross the Mediterranean, there appears to be little 
appetite on the part of the relevant States to allow applications to be lodged 
extraterritorially. If the right to ‘seek and enjoy asylum’ is to have any real meaning, 
however, one may posit that, whenever a State implements migration control 
arrangements the ultimate aim of which is unlawfully preventing individuals fleeing 
serious human rights abuses from reaching their borders and seeking protection, the 
recognition of a right of entry for the purposes of lodging an application for 
international protection is fully justified as a matter of legal reasoning and logic, and 
moreover constitutes arguably the only effective response which is available.  
